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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical
redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted,
where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals;
and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted
redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category.
Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a
large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the
redistribution goal.
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Winner-take-all markets are pervasive in our society. Whom to hire, promote, admit, elect, or
contract with are all determined in a tournament-like (winner-take-all) structure. In general, these
markets tend to emerge when there is quality variation, but little price ﬂexibility. As a result,
prizes tend to be awarded on the basis of relative, not absolute, performance. Indeed, Best Sellers,
World Cup champions, Harvard matriculants, Rhodes Scholars, ﬁrst-round draft picks, clerks to a
supreme court justice, cover girls, prime ministers, and Wimbeldon champions all have this feature
in common.
Because of their structure, winner-take-all markets have the feature that small diﬀerences in
quality can be associated with large diﬀerences in rewards, which makes it quite surprising that
there has been no theoretical analysis of redistribution in these environments. Understanding the
theoretical trade-oﬀs involved in redistribution within winner-take-all markets is of great importance
for public policy. For instance, aﬃrmative action in college admissions is a form of categorical
redistribution in a winner-take-all market.
In this paper, we analyze categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. A short synopsis
of our approach is as follows. There are many employers and many more individuals seeking
employment. Nature moves ﬁrst and assigns a marginal cost of investment to each individual.
Individuals observe their cost and choose a level of eﬀort to exert in the contest. Nature, then,
randomly assigns individuals to ﬁrms, where they are randomly matched to compete in pair-wise
contests. Absent any redistributional goal, the individual in each match with the higher level of
eﬀort wins an exogenously determined prize.
We establish three main results. First, we solve explicitly for the equilibrium of a heterogeneous
tournament model. In the unique equilibrium, an individual’s behavioral strategy involves emitting
eﬀort as a function of the distribution of individuals with cost above his. This leads naturally to
highly unequal outcomes between social groups endowed with diﬀerent cost distributions and, hence,
a demand for categorical (i.e., inter-group) redistribution. We go on to analyze category-sighted and
category-blind redistribution policies. The distinction between these two forms of redistribution
turns on how categorical information is used in the implementation of redistributive policies. We
show that the unique equilibrium under category-sighted redistribution involves a constant handicap
for agents in the disadvantaged category. This is similar, in particular, to employing a lower
2minimum standardized test threshold for admission into colleges and universities for applicants
belonging to disadvantaged categories. When we impose the category-blind constraint, the nature
of equilibrium handicapping changes drastically. Under this formulation, a non-trivial measure of
individuals pool on a common low eﬀort level and the prize is randomly distributed to members of
the pool whenever they are matched against one another. We conclude by discussing the problem
of optimal, centrally planned categorical redistribution, which draws on the impressive theory of
optimal auction design.
This paper lies at the intersection of several literatures: tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen
1981, Green and Stokey 1983, Rosen 1986), optimal auction design (Myerson 1981), and income
redistribution (Mirrlees 1971, Akerlof 1978). Our approach has little in common with the existing
models in the tournament literature. These models were developed to investigate the economic
eﬃciency of tournament play and to analyze tournaments as optimum labor contracts. In contrast,
we focus on the implications of redistribution in tournament-like environments.
There is a strong relationship between tournaments and auctions, as many tournament models
can be interpreted as all pay eﬀort auctions. This insight is useful because the optimal auction
design problem is well studied. The crucial diﬀerence lies in the distinction between centralized
and decentralized planning. The optimal auction design literature studies the centralized problem:
A planner designs auction procedures realizing that the structure of the auction will inﬂuence the
behavior of the bidders. In a labor market, however, where many employers draw on a common pool
of workers, it is more reasonable to think of de-centralized planning (i.e. each employer implements
her policy while assuming that her decision will not aﬀect applicants’ incentives). Decentralized
planning in the auction framework is an extremely unrealistic assumption, as it is rather like
designing an auction mechanism while taking the distribution of bids as exogenous! So, while
optimal categorical redistribution in a tournament model is closely related to the much studied
optimal auction design problem, the problem of decentralized equilibrium redistribution (which is
most pertinent in labor markets) has yet to be studied. This is the primary focus of our paper.
The paper is also related to the well studied problem of income redistribution. In the tra-
ditional optimal tax literature, individuals essentially pool their incomes and a central authority
redistributes the pool back to individuals in an incentive compatible manner. This approach is
quite diﬀerent from our proposed framework. Categorical redistribution in winner-take-all contests
3imposes an additional restriction on redistribution by constraining the employer to redistribute
utility (i.e. the probability of winning) using functionally irrelevant categorical identiﬁers in each
match, but allowing employers to reach their redistribution goals by aggregating outcomes across
all of their matches. In other words, when making a particular hiring decision, an employer must
choose between a given slate of candidates, but she evaluates those candidates with an eye toward
achieving suﬃcient categorical diversity across all of her hiring decisions.
The exposition proceeds as follows: section 2 presents and solves our pair-wise tournament
model; section 3 introduces the notion of categorical redistribution and analyzes category-sighted
and category-blind redistribution in a decentralized environment; section 4 draws parallels between
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Figure 1: Sequence of Actions
2 Model: Pair-wise Tournament Competition
Consider a simple model of tournament competition. There is a continuum of workers with unit
measure, and a large but ﬁnite number, N,of identical employers. Nature moves ﬁrst and distributes
a constant marginal cost of eﬀort to each worker. This cost is distributed according to an atomless
cumulative distribution function F (c),w h e r ec ∈ [cmin,c max],c min ≡ inf {c | F (c) > 0} ≥ 0, and
cmax ≡ sup{c | F (c) < 1} ≤∞ . Let f :[ cmin,c max] → <+ denote the associated probability density
function.
After observing their cost, each worker chooses an eﬀort level e. Each employer is then randomly
4matched with a continuum of workers of measure 1
N, who in turn are randomly matched with one
another to compete in a continuum of pair-wise contests for a measure 1
2N of positions. Thus,
each employer faces a pool of workers that is a statistical replica of the overall worker population.
Moreover, employers and workers anticipate that each worker will be paired for competition against
an opponent drawn randomly from the overall population. We assume that each employer takes the
workers’ eﬀort distribution as given, independent of her hiring policy, and chooses winners across
these pair-wise contests so as to maximize the expected eﬀort of those hired.1 The worker hired
from each pair receives an exogenously given wage ω, while the one not hired receives zero.
A strategy for workers is a function, e :[ cmin,c max] → <+, that maps their costs into an
eﬀort decision. A strategy for an employer is an assignment function in each pair-wise match,
A : <2
+ → [0,1], that maps the eﬀort levels she observes in each contest to a probability of winning
for each worker in that contest. A worker presenting eﬀort e wins against a worker presenting eﬀort
b e with a probability A(e,b e). Thus, the payoﬀ to a worker if he wins the contest is ω − ce,w h i l e
the payoﬀ is −ce if he loses.
A. Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of functions e∗(c) and A∗(e,b e) such that each is a best response to the
other.
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, for all c ∈ [cmin,c max] (1)
Proposition 1 provides a unique equilibrium behavioral strategy for workers that holds for
general cost distributions, and (trivially) a unique equilibrium assignment function for employers.
1This, of course, means that employers simply hire the contestant with the greater eﬀort, unless otherwise
constrained. Section 4 discusses employer behavior under a categorical redistribution constraint.
5In essence, the equilibrium eﬀort supply for any worker depends (in the manner illustrated in
equation 1) on the distribution of workers who have cost higher than his. Naturally, employers hire
the worker in each match with the higher eﬀort.
Let G(e) denote the population cumulative distribution of eﬀort in equilibrium, and let v(c)
denote the equilibrium net beneﬁt to an agent with cost c. It follows directly that this equilibrium

















Notice that, taken together, equations (1) and (3) deﬁne a mapping from the exogenous cumulative
distribution of costs, F (c), to the cumulative distribution of eﬀort in equilibrium, G(e), in the
natural way, which provides an explicit solution to the model.
To establish the proposition notice that, because workers choose eﬀort to maximize their net
beneﬁt, we have the ﬁrst-order condition: ω d
de[1 − G(e)]e=e∗(c) = c. A simple revealed preference
argument establishes that e∗ (c) is non-increasing in c. Hence, equilibrium behavior implies that



















. Integrating this yields:






Finally, e∗ (cmax)=0since a worker with cost c = cmax loses with probability one. This establishes
the result.
B. Introducing Categories
Suppose now that employers can divide the population of workers into two identiﬁable categories.
Let i ∈ {1,2} index a worker’s category, and let πi > 0 denote the fraction of the worker population
6belonging to category i,w h e r eπ1+π2 =1 . Hereafter, we use the subscript, i, to indicate categorical
identity. Thus, ei(c) denotes the eﬀort exerted by a member of category i with cost c, Fi denotes
the cumulative distribution function of cost for category i workers, and Gi denotes the cumulative
distribution of eﬀort (in equilibrium) among category i workers. We will assume throughout that
the cost distributions for the two categories have a common support.
Given our random matching assumptions, πi is also the probability that any worker, regardless
of his category, is paired to compete with a worker from category i. Since workers choose their
eﬀort prior to being paired against an opponent, and because they are assigned randomly to ﬁrms
and then paired with each other at random for competition within ﬁrms, every worker faces the
same distribution of opponents (i.e., a statistical replica of the overall worker population.) Thus,
despite any asymmetry between categories that arises when F1(c) 6= F2(c), the workers paired to
compete with one another are playing a symmetric game. So, absent any category-based policy
intervention, the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms and of workers (whatever their category) will be as
d e s c r i b e di nP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,w i t hF(c) ≡ π1F1(c)+π2F2(c).
Now, with two distinct categories, three types of matches are possible: a category 2 worker can
b em a t c h e dw i t hac a t e g o r y2 worker, which occurs with probability π2
2; a category 1 worker can be
m a t c h e dw i t hac a t e g o r y1 worker, which occurs with probability π2
1; and a mixed match (between
category 1 and category 2 workers) occurs with probability 2π1π2. We will assume that category
1 is “advantaged” relative to category 2, in that the category 1 cost distribution monotonically
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of category 2.
Deﬁnition 1 Category 1 is said to be advantaged relative to category 2, if
f1 (c)
f2 (c)
is a strictly decreasing function on (cmin,c max). (4)
This deﬁnition implies F1(c) >F 2(c) for all c ∈ (cmin,c max).L e t γ0 denote the probability that
a category 1 worker wins when matched with a category 2 worker, in the laissez-faire equilibrium
described in Proposition 1. We refer to γ0 as the “natural win rate” of category 1 agents over
category 2 agents. Given Deﬁnition 1, it is intuitively obvious and straightforward to show that
7γ0 ≡
R cmax
cmin dF1 (c)[1− F2 (c)] > 1
2.2
Because of the asymmetries in the cost distributions there will be a short-fall in the share of cat-
egory 2 agents hired by the employer, relative to their share of the worker population. Speciﬁcally,
the proportion of contests won by category 2 workers is
π2
2 +2 π2(1 − π2)(1 − γ0) <π 2,
in view of the fact that γ0 > 1
2. Thus, a demand for redistribution could naturally arise here. This
is the subject of the next section.
3 Decentralized Categorical Redistribution
Decentralized redistribution involves equilibrium handicapping of workers in the disadvantaged
category by employers who take the distribution of worker eﬀort as exogenous when setting the
handicap.3 For instance, a set of universities designing their admissions policies to ensure suﬃcient
categorical diversity, each of which thinks its policies are unlikely to aﬀect the eﬀort distribution
in the pool of college bound seniors from which its applicants are drawn, is a case of decentralized
categorical redistribution.
We will also employ the distinction between blind and sighted redistribution. Blind versus
sighted redistribution refers to what markers employers are allowed to use in the pursuit of her
redistribution policies. Category-sighted handicapping allows employers to use category identiﬁca-
tion directly in achieving their redistributive target. Category-blind handicapping forbids the use
of categorical information in achieving categorical redistributive goals.
2To make this transparent, notice that:
Z cmax
cmin
dF1 (c)[1− F2 (c)] =
Z cmax
cmin
dF1 (c)[1− F1 (c)] +
Z cmax
cmin
dF1 (c)[F1 (c) − F2 (c)] (5)
and Z cmax
cmin












Further, under the assumption that category 2 is disadvantaged,
R cmax
cmin dF1 (c)[F1 (c) − F2 (c)] is necessarily a positive
number. Thus, we have the desired inequality.
3For concreteness, one can think about redistribution in this context as coming about because all employers are
required by some external authority to increase their hiring rate for workers in the disadvantaged category, though
each employer acts independently of the others to achieve this goal.
8A. Category Sighted Decentralized Redistribution
Suppose a regulator wants to decrease the win rate of the advantaged category, and let γ ∈ [1
2,γ0)
denote the target level of categorical diversity.4 Notice that, as γ → γ0, the laissez-faire equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 obtains, while as γ → 1
2, the employer is forced to achieve categorical
parity.
It is straightforward to show that if an employer desires to maximize the expected eﬀort of
the contestants, subject to the constraint that agents from the advantaged category only win at




when matched with an agent from the disadvantaged category, then the best
w a yt od os oi st og i v ec a t e g o r y2 workers a constant eﬀort handicap, λ∗ (γ). In particular, the
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1 (c) >e ∗
2 (c)+λ∗ (γ)
0 if e∗
1 (c) <e ∗
2 (c)+λ∗ (γ)
,
where λ∗(γ) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the redistribution constraint. (In eﬀect, λ∗(γ) is the
“shadow price of diversity” when the redistribution target is γ.) Thus, the equilibrium handicap is
independent of the eﬀort levels of the contestants, and varies positively with the aggressiveness of
the redistribution goal.
It follows that, if e∗
i(c) denotes the equilibrium eﬀort supply of workers in category i ∈ {1,2},
then when an agent from category 1 is matched with an agent from category 2, the agent in category
1 wins the contests if
e∗
1 (c) >e ∗
2 (c)+λ∗ (γ).
Notice that a category 1 worker who exerts low eﬀort, e1 ∈ (0,λ ∗), must lose if matched with any
category 2 worker.
4That is, γ denotes the target win rate of Category 1 workers when matched against opponents from Category
2. Notice that, under sighted redistribution, these are the only matches that a regulator would seek to inﬂuence.
9We will now derive the equilibrium in this model under category-sighted redistribution with
target γ ∈ [1
2,γ0). Suppose there is an eﬀort cost threshold, c∗ (γ), such that category 1 agents
with cost c1 ≥ c∗ (γ) lose when matched with any category 2 agents, and category 1 agents with





dF1 (c)[1− F2 (c)] = γ. (7)
Notice, c∗ (γ) is increasing in γ, and c∗ (γ) tends toward cmax, as γ tends toward γ0; the natural
win rate of category1 agents over category 2’s.




, we must solve for the
equilibrium de-centralized handicap, λ, and the associated equilibrium eﬀort levels. This is the
subject of our next result.




and c∗ (γ) deﬁned in equation (7), the equilibrium de-centralized























































for all c ∈ [c∗ (γ),c max].
Proposition 2 provides a solution to the decentralized category-sighted handicapping problem.
The result depends critically on three factors: (1) constant marginal cost of eﬀort; (2) de-centralized
setting of handicaps by many independent employers facing regulation; and (3) random matching.
5We shall show momentarily that in the presence of constant eﬀort handicapping for category 2 agents the
equilibrium eﬀort supply functions imply this property.
10The solution implies a partition of agents into four classes: {category 1 or 2}×{high cost (c ≥ c∗ (γ))
or low cost (c<c ∗ (γ))}. For convenience of exposition, let Hi (resp. Li)d e n o t et h es e to fh i g h( r e s p .
low) cost types of category i ∈ {1,2}. The equilibrium behavior of the agents under decentralized
category-sighted handicapping can be summarized in the following concise manner. H0
is only com-
pete at the margin against other H0
is in their same category, and lose to L0
is in either category.
Further, L0
is compete at the margin against anyone with whom they are matched, prevailing if and
only if they encounter a contestant with higher cost. However, L0
2s receive the eﬀort subsidy λ∗ (γ),
such that e∗
1 (c)=e∗
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Figure 2: Decentralized Category-Sighted Equilibrium
To establish the proposition, let e = e1 = e2 + λ denote eﬀective eﬀort supply of agents,
when category 2 workers receive the eﬀort handicap λ. Given that, in equilibrium, ei ≥ 0 and
ei (cmax)=0 ,i =1 ,2, there exist a set of high costs agents in both categories (i.e., those with c
“close to” cmax) who supply relatively low eﬀort. For category 1 a g e n t st h i si m p l i e se = e1 ≈ 0,
and for category 2 agents this implies that e = e2 + λ ≈ λ>0. Thus, category 1 agents will face a
non-convex decision problem, in equilibrium, since at very low eﬀort levels (e1 <λ ) they compete
only against other high cost category 1 agents. At levels e1 >λ ,they discontinuously encounter
11additional beneﬁts from marginal increases in eﬀort, due to the presence of some high cost category
2 agents who are choosing e2 ≈ 0, so e2+λ ≈ λ. Figure 2 captures this intuition. Because category
1’s marginal beneﬁtc u r v ej u m p su p w a r da tλ, i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h eo p t i m a le ﬀort function
e∗
1 (c) is discontinuous. At cost c = c∗ the area (in Figure 2) A ≡ [λ − e1 (c∗)]·c∗ is exactly equal (by
construction) to the area B ≡
R e2(c∗)+λ
λ [MB2 (e) − c∗]de. Therefore, H0
1s prefer e∗
1(c) <λ ,a l o n g
the MB1 curve, whereas L0
1s prefer to “jump” past λ to some e∗
1(c) >e 2 (c∗)+λ. In other words,
all H0
1s choose to lose to all category 2 agents, should they end-up paired with one, and compete at
the margin only against other H0
1s; and all L0
is lose only if they are matched with a worker who has
lower cost. When λ has been set such that the constraint that workers in category 1 win against




holds, then it is straightforward to verify that
we must have c∗ = c∗ (γ) deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n(7).
Using equation (1) and noting that H0
is only compete at the margin against other H0
is in the
same category, we deduce that the marginal beneﬁt for category 1 and category 2 agents can be
expressed as:















1s always have the option of boosting their eﬀort to compete with category 2
workers. This is a break-even proposition when c = c∗ and strictly pays if c<c ∗. Hence, for all
c<c ∗, the eﬀort supply function looks much like that in Proposition 1. Both categories supply the

















as in Proposition 1, but with the boundary condition: e∗ (c∗)=e∗
2 (c∗)+λ. Finally, λ must satisfy
c∗ [λ − e∗
1 (c∗)] = v2 (c∗)







dF2 (y). By integrating equation (9), using
the relevant boundary conditions and deﬁnitions derived thus far, the conditions of the Proposition
12can be easily veriﬁed by algebraic manipulation.
B. Category-Blind Decentralized Redistribution
The employer’s problem is more complicated when she is not allowed to use categorical in-
formation in the pursuit of her redistributive goals. Employers observe two eﬀort levels in each
match, e and b e, but under the blindness assumption they do not know the categorical identity of
the workers. Accordingly, to achieve their redistributive objectives, employers need to estimate the
likelihood that each eﬀort level was emitted from a worker in the disadvantaged category. Thus, we
have a signalling model. This is a point worth further emphasis. Under category-sighted redistri-
bution an employer is allowed to narrowly tailor her policies for agents in disadvantaged categories
in order to achieve her categorical diversity goal — focusing exclusively on handicapping in mixed
contests. When constrained to be category-blind, however, she has to implement her policy across
all contests.
Let ξ (e) denote an employer’s belief about the probability that a worker with observed eﬀort



















1 if e + λξ (e) > b e + λξ (b e)
0 if e + λξ (e) < b e + λξ (b e)
,
where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier associated with the redistribution constraint — the shadow price
on category 2 membership. Let V (e)=e+λξ (e) denote the value to an employer of a worker with
observed eﬀort e. In any pair-wise contest, the employer hires the worker with the higher value. If
two matched workers have equal value, the employer chooses either with probability 1/2. This value
is comprised of two parts: the direct beneﬁt to the employer of eﬀort, and the expected beneﬁto f
diversity, which equals the product of the likelihood of an individual with eﬀort e belonging to the
disadvantaged category, times the shadow price of diversity.
To characterize equilibrium with category-blind redistribution, it is helpful to think about the
13qualitative properties of V (e). As in the model under Laissez-faire with no categorical redistribution
goal, a revealed preference argument establishes that the equilibrium eﬀort supply of workers,
e∗(c), must be non-increasing. If this function is strictly decreasing on [cmin,c max] then we have
as e p a r a t i n ge q u i l i b r i u m :e m p l o y e r s ,o b s e r v i n gaw o r k e r ’ se ﬀort, can invert the equilibrium eﬀort
supply function to learn the worker’s cost, and to infer the likelihood that the worker belongs to
category 2.I fe∗(c) is constant on some range of costs, then we have pooling in equilibrium. Now,
let E denote the set of eﬀorts reached by some worker in equilibrium: E = {e = e∗(c), for some
c ∈ [cmin,c max]}. It is obvious that if e∗(c) is an equilibrium eﬀort schedule for workers, then V (e)
must be strictly increasing on E. For if there were two levels of eﬀort, e, ˜ e ∈ E with e<˜ e and
V (e) ≥ V (˜ e), then any worker choosing ˜ e c o u l dg a i nb yr e d u c i n gh i sl e v e lo fe ﬀort to e,w h i c hl o w e r s
his cost incurred without lowering his chances of winning the contest. But, from this it follows that
a separating equilibrium cannot obtain here. For, if e∗(c) were strictly monotonic on (cmin,c max),
and if V (e) were strictly increasing on E, then a worker would not be hired whenever matched
against another worker with lower cost6, in which case the redistribution constraint could not be
satisﬁed. We conclude that there must be some pooling in equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium
eﬀort supply function, e∗(c), must be constant over some non-empty interval(s) of costs. Moreover,
a worker in the pool would be hired (not hired) with probability one when paired with a worker
whose eﬀort level is lower (higher) than that of the pool, and would be hired with probability
1/2 when paired with another worker in the pool. The size of the pool will increase with the
aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.
This situation is captured in Figures 3, which show a pooling equilibrium where all worker types
c in the closed interval [b c,b b c] select the common eﬀort level, epool. Figure 3A depicts a worker’s
value to the employer as a function of his eﬀort. Figure 3B shows the worker’s best response to the
employer strategy “hire that worker with the greater value,” as a function of the worker’s cost.
6Ties will occur with probability zero when e
∗(c) is strictly monotonic, since we have assumed the cost distribution
to be non-atomic.
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Figure 3: Decentralized Category-Blind Equilibrium
In any equilibrium under category-blind redistribution several conditions need to be satisﬁed, all
of which can be illustrated in Figures 3.7 First, the worker with marginal cost b c must be indiﬀerent
between leaving the pool by putting in eﬀort b e, which would imply that he wins for sure against all
workers in the pool, and exerting the eﬀort epool, which has him winning with probability 1
2 when
matched with anyone in the pool. Similarly, the worker with cost b b c must be indiﬀerent between
staying with the pool, and reducing his eﬀort to b b e. Also, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between hiring
from the pool, and hiring a worker with eﬀort level b e (resp., b b e)w h e ns u c haw o r k e ri sk n o w nt oh a v ea
cost [and associated probability of belonging to category 2]o fb c (resp., b b c).8 Finally, we must specify
an employer’s beliefs in the event that she were to observe an eﬀort e ∈ [b b e,epool) ∪ (epool,b e],w h i c h
is oﬀ the equilibrium path. To support the candidate pooling equilibrium, employers’ beliefs must
be such that they would strictly prefer a worker in the pool when matched against a hypothetical
worker with eﬀort in (the interior of) this region. Here we will appeal to a large literature on
7These ﬁgures depict a single pooled eﬀort level, whereas in principle there could be many pools in equilibrium.
However, we will soon introduce a natural restriction on employers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs that implies the existence
of a unique equilibrium in this model, with a single pool consisting of the highest cost worker types exerting the
minimal eﬀort level. Accordingly, the exposition proceeds from this point onward under the supposition that there
is but one pool in equilibrium.
8This indiﬀerence condition for ﬁrms is required because, were it to fail, then for any plausible oﬀ-equilibrium-
path beliefs that ﬁrms might hold, they would want to respond to some deviation from the pool in such a way as to
make that deviation pay for some workers in the pool.
15equilibrium reﬁnements and select a natural one, the D1 reﬁnement (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
Loosely speaking, the D1 reﬁnement requires out-of-equilibrium actions by informed agents
(workers) to be interpreted by uninformed agents (ﬁrms) as having been taken by the worker
type who would gain most [lose least] from the deviation, relative to his payoﬀ in the candidate
equilibrium, when this gain [loss] is calculated under the supposition that ﬁrms, while adopting
this interpretation, will respond to the deviant action in a manner that is best for themselves.
(Even more loosely speaking, the D1 reﬁnement requires ﬁrms to believe that the deviator is the
type who gains most from taking the deviant action when he knows that ﬁrms will discover his
type when he deviates, and then, based on knowing his type, will respond optimally to his deviant
action.) Equilibria supported by such out-of-equilibrium beliefs are called D1 equilibria.9 It is a
straight-forward exercise to compute the (unique) D1 equilibrium in our model.
Under D1, if an employer observes an eﬀort e ∈ (epool,b e], she believes that the deviator is the
lowest cost type in the pool, b c. (This type, compared to others either inside or outside of the pool,





≡ b ξ, for all e ∈ (epool,b e].
In light of the indiﬀerence conditions mentioned above, no workers inside or outside of the pool
have an incentive to deviate by choosing e in this interval. On the other hand, if epool > 0, and
if an employer observes an eﬀort e ∈ [b b e,epool), then under D1 she must believe that the deviator
is the highest cost type in the pool, b b c. (This type, compared to all of the others, gains most [loses




≡ b b ξ, for all e ∈ [b b e,epool).
But now, some workers will have an incentive to deviate. To see this, let ξpool be the probability
that a worker belongs to category 2, conditional on the worker being in the pool. Then, in light
9It has been shown that the only D1 equilibrium to the canonical Spence job signaling model is the Riley
(separating) equilibrium (Riley, 1979). This is the unique eﬃcient, separating equilibrium deﬁned by the initial
condition wherein the inﬁmal separating ability type adopts its complete information best educational investment
level, while all higher types choose the lowest educational levels consistent with separation (which strictly exceed
their respective complete information decisions.)
16of the assumption that category 1 is advantaged, the monotone ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
property implies:
b ξ<ξ pool ≡
π2[F2(b c) − F2(b b c)]
[F(b c) − F(b b c)]
< b b ξ.
Now, it was an implication of the ﬁrm’s constrained maximization problem that the value of a worker
to the ﬁrm is V (e)=e + λξ (e), with the Lagrangian multiplier (the shadow price of diversity)
λ>0. Hence, a worker in the pool can anticipate that his value will increase if he deviates by
lowering his eﬀort slightly below epool (since this marginal reduction induces ﬁrms to believe he is
strictly more likely than someone drawn from the pool to belong to category 2.) It follows that
in all D1 pooling equilibria, epool must equal zero. But then, since e∗(c) is non-increasing in any
equilibrium, we must have that b b c = cmax. Figures 4 replicate Figures 3 after the application of the




















Figure 4: Decentralized Category-Blind Equilibrium After Application of D1
We can summarize the discussion to this point as follows:




, the equilibrium de-centralized category-blind handicap, after




, where b e =
ω
2 [1 − F (b c)]
b c
;ξpool =
π2[1 − F2(b c)]
[1 − F(b c)]




and where b c is the unique solution for
Z b c
cmin
dF1 (c)[1− F2 (c)] +
1
2
[1 − F1 (b c)] · [1 − F2 (b c)] = γ.
The equilibrium eﬀort supply function for both categories is given by





,c ∈ [cmin,b c),
and
e∗ (c)=0 , for all c ∈ [b c,cmax].
Proposition 3 highlights an important feature of category-blind redistribution; there is a non-
trivial measure of workers that supply zero eﬀort. And, this pool increases with the aggressiveness
of the redistributive goal. In the extreme case where the employer strives for categorical parity, the
only D1-equilibrium involves all workers supplying zero eﬀort and the employer picking at random
between them!10
To establish the proposition, consider ﬁgures 4. In order to derive the equilibrium, we must pin
10This result has a curious implication that warrants mention. If the cost distributions are identical for the two
categories, then each category prevails in half the mixed contests, without any constraint on ﬁrm actions. So, the
equilibrium eﬀort schedule given in Proposition 1 (which is a positive, strictly decreasing function of eﬀort cost) obtains
in this case, automatically generating γ =
1
2. Yet, with only the slightest (strict monotone likelihood ratio) diﬀerence
in cost distributions favoring category 1, our characterization given above of the unique D1 equilibrium under category-
blind redistribution with representation target γ =
1
2 implies zero eﬀort for all agents. This discontinuity of the
equilibrium eﬀort supply schedule, as a function of the cost distributions, when population proportionality is the
aﬃrmative action target is curious, and it is not an artifact of our having imposed the D1 reﬁnement. For (per the
argument just given) in any equilibrium, when ﬁrms see an eﬀort level e they (in eﬀect) place some value V (e) on a
worker with that eﬀort level, hiring from any pair of workers the one whose value is greater. Moreover, V (e) must be
strictly increasing on the set of eﬀorts observed by ﬁrms in equilibrium, and e
∗(c) must be non-decreasing, otherwise
workers could not be best-responding. All of which implies V (e
∗(c)) must be non-increasing in any equilibrium, which,
in light of Deﬁnition 1 implies that the target γ =
1
2 can only be met in equilibrium if the set E is a singleton. So,
population proportionality as a target together with strict cost distribution diﬀerences between the groups, however
small, requires a pooling equilibrium with all workers taking the same eﬀort level. Imposing D1 merely forces that
pooled eﬀort level to be zero. Hence, the aforementioned discontinuity does not depend on imposing D1.
18down four parameters: (i) b c; (ii) b e; (iii) λ; and (iv) e∗ (c) for all c ∈ [cmin,b c]. Under category-blind
redistribution, the eﬀort incentives at the margin (for both categories) of those not in the pool are
identical to the marginal incentives facing workers in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Using Proposition




y for all c ∈ [cmin,b c). Thus, we are left with three
equations (the workers’ and ﬁrms’ indiﬀerence conditions and the representation constraint,) and
three unknowns (b c,b e,λ).C o n s i d e r , ﬁrst, the representation constraint (which requires that the
probability a category 1 worker wins when matched against a category 2 worker just equals γ.) In
the D1-equilibrium being asserted here, this amounts to:
Z b c
cmin
dF1 (c)[1− F2 (c)] +
1
2
[1 − F1 (b c)] · [1 − F2 (b c)] = γ (10)
Hence, the cost cut-oﬀ b c solves equation 10, which pins down (i).
Now, consider the workers’ indiﬀerence condition. The worker with cost b c must be indiﬀerent
between exerting eﬀort b e and eﬀort 0. If he exerts b e he beats all workers in the pool and incurs
the cost b cb e; if he invests 0, he ties all workers in the pool — winning with a probability of 1
2 when




2 [1 − F (b c)]
b c
,
which pins down (ii).
Finally, to establish the equilibrium shadow price of diversity, λ, consider the ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence
condition:
b e + λb ξ = λξpool,






which establishes the desired result.
194 Centralized Categorical Redistribution: A Discussion
There is an impressive literature in economics involving optimal auction design. Insights from this
literature can be directly applied to the analysis of tournaments in labor economics. In this section,
we provide a brief discussion of the setup and solution of the optimal auction design problem and
how it can be used to inform centralized categorical redistribution.11
Centralized redistribution is a mechanism design problem in which an employer selects the
optimal (incentive compatible and individually rational) handicapping scheme — realizing that his
employment policies will aﬀect the workers’ investment behavior. For instance, if a substantial
fraction of college bound high school seniors attend in-state universities, then aﬃrmative action
programs designed by the state university system’s Board of Regents could provide an example of
centralized categorical redistribution. In our model, with the assumptions of constant marginal cost
of eﬀort and random pair-wise matching of competitors, the solution to the optimal tournament
design problem is isomorphic to the optimal auction design problem with two (asymmetric) bidders.
Indeed, optimal handicapping in tournaments can be interpreted as the optimal auction design
problem with the additional constraint that a certain category of bidders win the auction at no less
than some minimal rate.
A. Setting Up the Optimal Tournament Design Problem
Let there be one employer and two workers competing for employment. Assume that this
competition will be replicated many times over, as pairs of competing workers are drawn from
a large population. The employer is interested in designing a tournament that maximizes the
expected eﬀort of the winner, perhaps subject to some categorical representation constraint. The
employer’s problem derives from the fact that he does not know the eﬀort costs of the workers.
In a direct revelation mechanism, the contestants simultaneously and conﬁdentially announce
their cost of eﬀort. The employer then determines who wins the employment tournament and how
much eﬀort each contestant must exert, as some functions of the reported costs c =( c1,c 2).12 A
direct revelation mechanism is described by a pair of functions (A,e) (of the form A :[ cmin,c max]
2 →
11For the details of the optimal auction design problem, we refer the reader to Myerson (1981).
12Here, by taking c to be the cost vector for a pair of contestants rather than the cost type of an arbitrary
contestant, we slightly shift our notational convention from that of the previous section.
20[0,1] and e :[ cmin,c max]
2 → <2
+) such that if c is the vector of announced costs, Ai (c) is the
probability that i wins the tournament and ei (c) denotes the eﬀort i must exert.13
The employer and the contestants are assumed to be risk neutral, and contestants have utility
functions that are additively separable in wages and eﬀort cost. If contestant i knows that his eﬀort




[Ai (c)ω − ei (c)ci]f−i (c−i)dc−i (11)












There are three types of constraints that must be imposed on the pair of functions (A,e) to
ensure their feasibility. First, since each employer only has one position to ﬁll, the function A must
satisfy the following probability conditions:
2 X
i=1
Ai (c) ≤ 1 and Ai (c) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1,2} and c ∈ [cmin,c max]
2 . (13)
Second, we assume that the employer cannot force a worker to participate in a tournament.
Thus, the following individual rationality conditions must be satisﬁed:
Ui (A,e,ci) ≥ 0, for all ci,i ∈ {1,2} . (14)
Third, we assume that the employer can not prevent any worker from lying about his eﬀort
costs if he can gain from lying. If worker i were to claim that b ci were his eﬀort cost when it really
was ci, then his expected utility would be
Z cmax
cmin
[Ai (b ci,c −i)ω − ei (b ci,c −i)ci]f−i (c−i)dc−i
Therefore, to guarantee that no worker has an incentive to lie about his eﬀort cost, the following
13Here the subscript i denotes contestants, not categories. Later, when we restrict attention to categorically
heterogeneous matches, this distinction will be irrelevant.




[Ai (b ci,c −i)ω − ei (b ci,c −i)ci]f−i (c−i)dc−i for all i ∈ {1,2} and b ci ∈ [cmin,c max]
(15)
We say that a tournament mechanism (A,e) is feasible if and only if (13), (14), and (15) are all
satisﬁed. So, (A,e) represents an optimal tournament if and only if it maximizes UE (A,e) subject
to (13) − (15).14
B. A Solution to the Optimal Tournament Design Problem
T h e r ei sl i t t l ed i ﬀerence, analytically, between our “tournaments” and the “auctions” in Myerson
(1981). To move from our current framework to that analyzed in Myerson (1981), one needs to
multiply each agent’s utility by a scaling factor that depends only on his own type. This amounts
to a simple change of variables. It is straightforward to show that by deﬁning bidder i’s “value”
in the optimal auction, ti, design problem such that ti = ω
ci, one arrives at a formulation that is
isomorphic to the tournament problem when the wage is ω and the ith contestant’s cost is ci. So, to
study the optimal centralized tournament, we can simply carry over Myerson’s results, translated
into our notation, where his bidder valuation ti is related to our worker eﬀort cost, ci,v i at h a t
equation: ti = ω
ci.
Thus, let Hi(ti) be the CDF of bidder i0s valuation in Myerson’s context, and let hi(ti) be the












Now, let ψ(ti)=ti −
1−Hi(ti)
hi(ti) denote what Myerson (1981) called the virtual valuation of bidder
i. Myerson proved that the solution to the optimal auction design problem assigns the object to
the bidder with the highest virtual valuation, and requires that bidder to pay an amount equal
to the minimum actual valuation he could have had that would still have allowed him to prevail
in the auction. To translate this idea into our tournament model, ﬁrst note that our analogue to
14It may appear, superﬁcially, that we have changed the structure of the game by assuming that workers exert
eﬀort before being matched with employers in our analysis of decentralized redistribution and after being matched
with employers in the centralized case. But, these two formulatoins are equivalent so long as workers exert eﬀort
before they know the eﬀort of the worker with whom they are matched.









For any costs cj,j6= i, let
µi (cj)=s u p
n
ci | b ψ(ci) ≥ b ψ(cj)
o
.
So, µi (cj) is the highest cost report for worker i such that his virtual valuation is greater than that
of worker j. Employing a similar derivation to that found in Myerson (1981, Lemmas 2 and 3), one















y , if Ai (c)=1
0 otherwise
.
We conclude that the optimal tournament gives the position to the contestant with the higher
virtual valuation, as expressed in equation 17 above, and only requires eﬀort from those that are
hired. The amount of eﬀort that they exert is the minimum consistent with incentive compatibility
that is needed to distinguish themselves from a marginally higher eﬀort cost type.
Let us now adopt the interpretation that the two contestants in the tournament are members
of two distinct categories of the worker populations. (In eﬀect, we restrict attention to the design
problem for categorically heterogeneous contests.) The interesting aspect of the optimal tournament
from our perspective is that, even in the absence of any categorical representation constraint,
the expected eﬀort-maximizing tournament will generally involve some (possibly mild) degree of
handicapping. To see this, notice that the virtual valuation is simply a scalar times the reciprocal
of each contestant’s eﬀort cost, minus what is, in eﬀect, an inverse hazard ratio. Thus, suppose
the reciprocal of a worker’s eﬀort costs were distributed exponentially in each category. In this
special case, the virtual valuation in equation 17 is simply the reciprocal of a contestant’s eﬀort
cost, minus the mean of the reciprocal of the eﬀort cost for their respective category. So, i beats
j if the diﬀerence in their eﬀorts is larger than the diﬀerence in the means of the reciprocal of
23eﬀort cost for their respective categories! It follows that a desire for small amounts of categorical
redistribution in a centralized planning framework need not conﬂict with eﬃciency.15
If we want more aggressive redistribution, however, this constraint may indeed be binding.
Suppose a tournament designer wants to have a level of categorical diversity beyond that which
naturally occurs in the tournament design problem. Setting up the employers maximization problem
is virtually identical to our analysis of the ﬁrst best mechanism, with an added representation








Ai (c) b ψ (ci)+λ[γ − A2 (c1,c 2)]
!
dF1 (c1)dF2 (c2)
subject to (13), (14), and (15). Then, (A,e) represents an optimal tournament, conditional on
achieving representation, γ.
The solution to this constrained optimal tournament is straightforward. If contestant i belongs
to the advantaged category and contestant j belongs to the disadvantaged category; i beats j,i f
a n do n l yi f
b ψ (ci) > b ψ (cj)+λ.
The category-blind centralized problem is solved in a similar fashion. The optimal tournament
design problem for an employer who desires redistribution and is forced to be category-blind shows
that in all close matches, the contestant with the lower virtual valuation wins. The intuition is
that the employer realizes that the disadvantaged category will, on average, ﬁnish second when
matched with the advantage category. Therefore, in close matches, she allows the lower valuation
contestant to win—assuming that enough of the winners will be disadvantaged to achieve the desired
representation goal. She does this in all matches, because she is constrained to be category blind.
15Our point here is similar to the classical observation that a price-setting monopsonist buying from sellers drawn
from two identiﬁably distinct population groups with diﬀerent cost distributions will genereally price-discriminate in
such a way as to favor the group with the more price-elastic supply curve. Here the ﬁrm is “buying” eﬀort from
workers in the two categories, while paying them with a probability of winning the contest. Moreover, the “elasticity
of supply” of workers able to proﬁtably exert a given level of eﬀort is greater for the disadvantaged category. This
interpretation centralized handicapping in the optimal tournament is an exact analogue of that oﬀered in Bulow and
Roberts (1989) for the optimal auction.
245C o n c l u s i o n
Tournament competition is an economic phenomenon that arises in many venues. The existing
literature has been centered around the economic eﬃciency of tournament play and analyzing tour-
naments as optimum labor contracts. This paper opens new directions in the study of tournament
theory by deriving the equilibrium handicapping strategy of employers in a decentralized environ-
ment. This, together with the contributions in the optimal auction design literature, take us a
considerable way in understanding categorical redistribution in winner-take-all environments.
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